In The Same Boat or Rocking the Boat?: A snippet from a post-radio debate

After going on Backpack Radio last week I have been involved, on and off, with a debate that occurred on an atheist's Facebook post. The individual who posted, posted a link to the interview, and then tagged me with the phrase "In the Same Boat." He has been laboring, unsuccessfully, to prove that even based on Christian presuppositions, one cannot have certainty or a foundation for knowledge. A lot of the ensuing discussion revolved around the nature of presuppositional debates. As I said in the interview, a presupp debate is effective when one states their worldview, and then critiques the opposing worldview by its internal merits. Most of the debate was me pointing out that their critique of the Christian worldview was not an internal critique, but an insertion of their own faulty categories into the Christian worldview in order to damage it. They kept claiming I was also evaluating their worldview by inserting my own categories into it, yet without being specific as to how I was doing that. At the end of the debate they finally gave me specifics, and it was quite revealing. Apparently, the very categories of coherence and correspondence with an objective reality, they reject as a purely Christian concept, as they openly embrace an ultimate irrationalism. That is a stunning admission to the fact that atheism produces no coherence, correspondence, and has no foundation for knowledge. Below is the last bit of exchange. I decided to post it, while hiding their names, in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the presuppositional argument.

Atheist 1: Colin S, Is having an internally consistent, justified and coherent worldview of value to you? Is it a standard by which you evaluate the worth of your worldview? Yes?

Further, are you obligated to justify your worldview by my worldview's standards? No?

Cool, ya see what I did there? I just exposed your blindspot.

Because, ya see, for the same reasons you're worldview isn't susceptible to evaluation from standards in my wv, mine is impervious to evaluation from standards in yours.

What if, using your internal critique method, I don't care that my worldview is not absolutely consistent, justifies or coherent?

What if i accept philosophical dilemmas and scientific mysteries as items that actually strengthen my worldview, such that it's incompleteness allows for room for growth and awe?

I don't engage in your spitting contest. Atheists haven't dropped the ball, they firmly place it down.

CSmall: Ah. I see what your saying. Thanks for your honestly.

Atheist 2: Colin, I agree, you are operating under a number of double-standards. As Christopher has just pointed out, you are applying your own standards within your worldview to other worldviews, while claiming this is not allowed for other people. I find it rather ironic that you will go to great lengths to argue that atheists are not "incapable of comparing and contrasting comparative worldviews" - well look no further.

We have done just that. And to the point where we have exposed your own double-standards, inconsistencies and absurdities within your own worldview.

//Well, Colin, the SAME THING could be said about your assertions. You assume correspondence between your thoughts and God. You have not demonstrated that such is the case, but merely asserted it... such a claim is not axiomatic.//

"Yes, according to YOUR worldview God is something that just exists in my head."

Another dodge, and another appeal to a definition with NO justification. And I wasn't even talking about your lack of justification in terms of my worldview, I was talking about your own standards - that "assumption of correspondence" which you fail to demonstrate but merely assert (and which you don't "know" according to your own definition of knowledge). Why is it you can say this to other people while being guilty of THE VERY SAME THING?

There are a few simple facts we both share regarding our 'abilities' and the 'conditions' of our epistemologies within our worldviews:

1. we are both 'stuck' on the receiving end of a stream of information, whether that be sensory data from the external world, or a "revelation" directly from a deity.

2. we are both fallible, yet we both rely heavily on our senses and experiences to form our worldviews.

3. we both must assume certain axioms in order to experience and make sense of the external world (the world at the other end of the stream of information), and we both cannot "get behind", or "justify" those axioms.

The problem is, while you are raging war with non-Christians for not being able to justify certain axioms, you yourself are hiding behind a baseless claim of "absolute certain knowledge".... with no ultimate justification of your own, other than a viciously circular argument. Instead of admitting this, you tap dance around the questions and continue to beg the question with every response.

CSmall: "We have done just that. And to the point where we have exposed your own double-standards, inconsistencies and absurdities within your own worldview."

Actually you haven't done that at all. You have failed to critique my worldview from the inside out, and I have taken care to break down how that is so. Never once have you brought a charge against me that I was misrepresenting your worldview in its metaphysic or epistemology. I called you a logical positivist once and you denounced that charge. I wasn't satisfied with your explanation on how you aren't LP, but I dropped the label. However, when you speak like an empiricist, I critique you as one. Most of my answers have been on the defensive of you inserting your own assumptions in my worldview. I have seen a few accusations, but no specifics, of what exactly I was inserting from my worldview into my critique of yours... Until Christopher posted above....

Christopher just stated that he basically doesn't care if his worldview is incoherent and not correspondent with reality. If that is what you are saying as well, and if you are claiming that the general category of correspondence and coherence is something that only exists in my worldview, and thus cannot be applied to yours; then the conversation is over. You have conceded that intelligibility and rationality are only possible if my worldview is true, and that the under currents of such things (ie coherence and correspondence) have no place in your worldview.

"Another dodge, and another appeal to a definition with NO justification. And I wasn't even talking about your lack of justification in terms of my worldview, I was talking about your own standards - that "assumption of correspondence" which you fail to demonstrate but merely assert (and which you don't "know" according to your own definition of knowledge). Why is it you can say this to other people while being guilty of THE VERY SAME THING?"

We've gone over this before. I explained the difference between my axiom, and yours. My axiom (God) is self-sustaining and under girds the axioms and preconditions necessary for human predication, ontologically and not arbitrarily. Your axioms aren't axioms and need outside entities and realities in order to justify themselves, so they aren't a proper starting point for knowledge. Furthermore, you are an inherently mental creature who knows through verbal constructs. Yet you believe that reality is made up of non-mental realities (matter) which cannot engage in verbal communication. The problem there is that one needs to know something about the basic nature of reality, before they can investigate particulars or more specific information about it. We need to know what reality is, before we can know how we can know it. In other words, we need revelation about reality, from an outside source, before we can begin predicating. Your problem is that what you believe reality to be outside of yourself is fundamentally incommunicable and disjointed from what you are as a thinking, human subject. What follows from that is that reality cannot come to you and verbally express it's nature to you so that you can know, or even define it (matter is defined as "stuff"), and thus truly know it or begin predicating about it. So you're two problems are, your axioms aren't axiomatic, they implicate outside realities to justify themselves; and also what you say reality is, is fundamentally different from what you are, causing a fundamental epistemological problem that further estranges you from correspondence.

In contradistinction, the Christian will say that knowledge and reality begins with, and comes from the self-contained Trinity, who is self-existent and not referential to any other reality than Himself, and whose very ontological properties provides a foundation for human reason and sense experience to be justified sources of knowledge in their appropriate spheres. Furthermore we are made in God's image and likeness, and are thus "like him" at a finite level, particularly when it comes to our mental life. So therefore, there can be revelation or communication from His mind to ours pertaining to his own nature, the nature reality which he made, and the nature of ourselves.

Atheist 1: Colin, thanks for your understanding. Would love to chat sometime. PM me if interested.

Atheist 1: //Christopher just stated that he basically doesn't care if his worldview is incoherent and not correspondent with reality.// Mostly yes

//If that is what you are saying as well, and if you are claiming that the general category of correspondence and coherence is something that only exists in my worldview, and thus cannot be applied to yours; then the conversation is over. You have conceded that intelligibility and rationality are only possible if my worldview is true, and that the under currents of such things (ie coherence and correspondence) have no place in your worldview.// No

That is where you are crossing over from internal critique to external critique. Correspondence and coherence exist in atheist worldviews, but a fetishized obsession with absolute correspondence and coherence is not valued. That absolute value may exist in your worldview, whereas it's relative cousin exists in ours.

CSmall: So what does that mean? How does that play out?

CSmall: And to help you clarify your thoughts here, from my perspective that sounds like: "Okay, okay, no we are not totally irrational and we don't reject correspondence and coherence totally. Rather, we believe there is correspondishness and coherenceness out there somewhere along with truthiness." It seems you don't want to loose those category now, but are leaving them open ended and vague so that if someone wants to interact with you about it, it will be like hammering jello to a wall. Not to be derogatory, but that is how it sounds. So what do you mean?

Atheist 1: Oh no, I think we're all irrational. Seriously.

Are Atheists Just Guessing? A follow up on a broken thought.

This past Thursday, I had the privilege of joining Vocab Malone and Pastor Vermon on Backpack Radio. The topic revolved around Facebook debates, epistemology and apologetics. To make a long story short, after having debated a few local atheists on their facebook page, I was asked if I would like to come on the show and speak to above subjects. The show is known for having both well-known scholars on, as well as the "average Joe" (fyi, I fall into the latter category ;). While the show is prerecorded, it is recorded as if it is live. I was not given a list of specific questions to answer, just general themes which we would be dealing with in each segment. Being my first time on the radio, and also being a seminary student who loves to preach right out of his manuscript, one can imagine that there were a few times when I got ahead of myself and felt a little "jumbled" in my answesr. One answer stuck out to me almost immediately after having given it, which I would like to clarify/address with this post.

In the second segment, I believe it was Vermon who asked me what exactly epistemology was. After defining epistemology ("a theory of knowledge"), and opening up the components of having "justified true belief," I made a statement that was somewhat unclear and may sound unfair or inaccurate without some clarification. In describing what it means for true belief to be "justified," I used the analogy of me and someone else taking a quiz. In the scenario the correct answer was (b), which both me and my neighbor got correct. However, in my case I simply guessed, whereas my neighbor studied and "knew" the answer was (b). I simply had a "hunch" or a "guess," juxtaposed to my neighbor who had a reason for his selection. In the analogy, we both got the answer right, but only my neighbor;s answer was justifiably right, in epistemological terms. I then made the claim that atheists who justify their belief in unchanging, universal laws of logic and science, based off of the fact that they "work;" are like the person who guesses on quiz, gets the right answer, and assumes that they were justified in being right. I had indeed jotted down this point in my notes, as I had planned on making it. However, in the context in which I said it, it felt premature and requiring more explanation. Not wanting to go on a deeper rabbit trail from the original question (what is epistemology?), I sort of panicked and gave a broken explanation of the point and tried to move on. So with the background aside, I think I need to clarify my point.

At the very best my thought seemed broken, at the very worst, it seemed as if I was accusing atheists of being purely arbitrary or erratic in their formulations. I know that most atheists value the scientific method, and believe they have reasons for their unbelief, so I want to make it clear that that is not what I was trying to convey. My intended point was this. The atheist claims that reality is fundamentally unguided, unconscious, and irrational (or at least non-rational). Furthermore, they believe that the human mind has arisen through non-rational processes, by means of a mechanism for survival, not a mechanism for arriving at "truth" (namely, natural selection). And yet the entire scientific enterprise rests upon the presumption that the functioning of the human mind corresponds to reality, and that reality operates according to regularities. They are saying that reality is one way (based upon their worldview), but they are talking and acting in it, as if it is another way. When questioned as to what grounds they have for believing in unchanging, universal laws given their worldview; atheists often say something to the effect that it "works to act as if reality is that way" (ie ordered and rational).

However, there are two main problems with this answer. First, that answer does not resolve the tension in their worldview. After all, how can the way reality behaves, or "works" (as if it is rational reflecting order around universals) be reconciled with what they presuppose about it (that it is non-rational and composed of chaotically interacting particulars)? But secondly, and most importantly, it also doesn't answer the question. Do laws of logic, and rational regularities in nature, have some sort of ontological grounding or existence? Or, are these merely human concepts that find some correspondence 'here and there?' If it is the former, then the atheist needs to explain how such structures can exist in their metaphysical worldview. However, if it is the latter, which is the answer I normally get from atheists, then they have a problem of justification. A handful of human observations, in comparison to the vast age of the universe (according to the atheist), does not "justify" belief in universal laws of thought or science. One could only justify such a claim if they had observed every square inch of the universe, for every second, in the life of the universe. But in the big picture, all we have are a few observations, which appear as if they correspond to the concept of rational "laws" and regularities. So if the atheist is right, we are like the person who picked a few answer on a test that happened to be right. But there is no justification there. And if you do not have justification for universal laws of thought or science, then you have no knowledge. Greg Bahnsen elaborates:

"It should be noted here that by "justified" we mean that the person actually has sound reasons (good evidence), not simply that he thinks his evidence is good or sufficient in light of the pool of information available to him [...] Accordingly, having a warrant for one's belief(s) is essential to knowledge. This explains why the issue of justification has always been a critical one throughout the history of epistemology. E.g., when and how are claims that we make well founded? Or, how do we acquire, or what is the source of, reliable beliefs? On what basis is intellectual authority conferred upon our ideas? By what standard are our judgments to be evaluated? How do we know what we know?" (Bahnsen,"Van Til's Apologetics," 178)

In answer to those questions, Dr. Bahnsen, and all sounds Christians, will say that the answer to all of those questions is God's revelation. The infinite, personal God of Christianity has revealed some things pertaining to Himself, ourselves, and reality; such that we can be certain. Furthermore, he sends the Holy Spirit into our hearts, to "internalize" the Word of God, so that it becomes not just a distant object, or a hypothetical, but immanently apparent to us as subjects made in His image. When God's revelation is presupposed, and the content of it believed, one has a justification for true belief in laws of logic, and laws of science (as well as a whole host of other things). Anything else is just guess work, commonly known as speculation. Furthermore, history itself attests to the fact that science arose out of the worldview of Christendom, not atheism. No one took an unbiased "leap in the dark" about reality and discovered that science "works." No, we have a much more certain ground to stand on than that. And thankfully, so does the atheist, which is exactly how he knows what he knows, because in his heart of hearts, he truly knows God.

"For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, 19 because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse, because, although they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God, nor were thankful, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts were darkened." (Rom. 1:18-21)

(P.S. More follow up posts pertaining to my interview may be forthcoming :)

Penn Jillete and Rape

I recently came across this "meme" while perusing through Facebook. I've seen this kind of argument made by several of the "new atheists." Not only does it completely miss the point, but it simply is not honest. I've never seen this meme before, but I found it a little ironic in light of recent revelations about skeptic Michael Shermer's behavior towards women, which I covered here. As I said, I do not think these kind of arguments are honest about human nature. For example, multiple times a week I have the unfortunate privilege of hearing men check out women and talk out loud about all the things they would like to do to them. In their external dialogue about their internal desires, there is not one care for the woman's soul, or "romance" or whatever. All one finds is an aggressive considerations of how their bodies could gratify them. Indeed, with most men in the "dating" culture, most of the time, all outward demonstrations of care for a woman's personality, or romantic appreciations of them, is simply a means to get the gratification they think they deserve. THAT is the heart of a rapist. In my experience, most women in the dating culture are keenly aware of this. However, the reason why most of those men will not engage in rape, and will even condemn it consciously/publicly, is because they have been conditioned by a civilization with broadly Christian roots to find rape aesthetically displeasing. The desire's of their hearts say otherwise. So what happens when the worldview that framed rape as bad disintegrates? When we are pictured as mere biological robots, who evolved from pond scum, that then progressed up the evolutionary chain in many species through rape; how can one still call rape "wrong" in the true sense of the word? Can anything be considered "wrong" in such a world? On top of that, Mr. Jillette is a supporter of the prostitution industry in Nevada, which feeds into the very instincts that he apparently denies the majority of men even have. So I do not find that Penn is honest with himself in how he frames this objection.

On top of that, even if he was "sinless" in this regard, never having had a desire to exploit women; in his universe that is absolutely meaningless. Rape and consensual sex are nothing but atoms banging into one another. Nothing is "wrong" or "right," for that matter, in such a world. Saying rape is wrong is just an opinion, like saying that blue is a better color than red. Even if one wants to go the existentialist route and say that it is up to the individual to create morality, one cannot argue that their self-generated moral system extends beyond their 3 pound brain. Much less can they claim that it corroborates with abstract concepts like "truth," "goodness," or "beauty." They certainly cannot congratulate themselves for their tastes above others who go a different route, as Mr. Jillette seemingly does here. "I don't need God, because I know how to live a 'good life' without Him," isn't an argument in the atheist's own world. It is just brain fizz. These kind of arguments only appeal to people in a post-Christian society where they still enjoy some of the fruit left over from the Biblical worldview. You don't have to look very far to see what happens when that foundation is officially abolished.

The thing is, the Christian worldview can account for why even an atheist knows that rape is wrong. The Christian will claim that even the rapist knows that rape is wrong. That is because the law is written on everyone's heart, as they are made in the image of God (See Romans 2:1-16). Even apart from the influence of the Christian church, one sees a recognition of deity, accountability, and the law of God in all cultures. However, time and time again, when a culture consciously rejects the light of biblical religion, they condescend to depths worse than pre-Christian pagans. So not only can the Christian worldview give a better account of Mr. Jilette's claims here, it can also give a better account of why man is prone to such evil. Scripture informs us that simple lust of the heart is directly related to sins such as adultery, rape, and much worse things as well. Apart from God's restraining grace we would all descend into such debauchery. But even further, Scripture ends up giving us not just a better picture of the moral law, and man's sin, but it also gives us the solution as well. Christ crucified, buried, resurrected and ascended.

John Calvin on the Ethical Nature of Belief in God

Calvin affirms that all men have a knowledge of God, but that they do not respond properly to this knowledge. The sinful nature, which effects the intellect, is the source of unbelief, not a lack of information. Unbelievers know God exists. This reality also takes the gusto out of the argument of universalists or sycretists who argue their position based upon a vague notion of God found in various religions. Calvin writes:

Nevertheless, it is one thing to feel that God as our Maker supports us by his power, governs us by his providence, nourishes us by his goodness, and attends us with all sorts of blessings-and another thing to embrace the grace of reconciliation offered to us in Christ.

Further, he states,

Moreover, although our mind cannot apprehend God without rendering some honor to him, it will not suffice simply to hold that there is One whom all ought to honor and adore, unless we are also persuaded that he is the fountain of every good, and that we must seeking nothing elsewhere than in him [...] (Institutes Book I. Ch. II.i)

According to Calvin (and Paul in Romans 1), man does not have an intellectual problem, he has a moral problem with God. He knows who God is, as even the demons know God and tremble (James 2:19). We should not be surprised then that we see the knowledge of God in all men, and that often they may give themselves over to their better knowledge as they seek a benefit from doing so (ie to appease conscience, earn blessings, or be "moral"). The problem according to Scripture, as Calvin points out, is that men are "holding back" or suppressing the truth. They will not fully commit themselves to God because they do not trust in the goodness of God. Their unbelief is rooted in an implicit slander against God. It is founded in ungodliness and is strengthened by their unrighteousness. Calvin elaborates:

For until men recognize that they owe everything to God, that they are nourished by his fatherly care, that he is the Author of their every good, that they should seek nothing beyond him-they will never yield him willing service. Nay, unless they establish their complete happiness in him, they will never give themselves truly and sincerely to him. (Ibid)

If you examine the narrative of the fall, in Genesis 3, it is the goodness of God that Satan attacks in tempting Eve to turn from him and try and become god herself. Indeed, this noetic (or mental) effect of sin is implanted in all of us, unless the Holy Spirit regenerates us. That is why we grow in our sanctification as we come to find our joy in the goodness and grace of God. To hear this fleshed out further, check out this sermon on Genesis 3.

God and Creation: Why Monistic Idealism is Certainly False: A Review of Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos"

The last decade has seen a slew of books written by philosophical atheists, attacking the Christian faith as being irrational. Often what underlies such writings is a smug arrogance that ignores epistemological and metaphysical issues which trouble the naturalistic worldview. A dogmatic adherence to Darwinism, scientific positivism, and an epistemology of “atheism is more rational because I said so,” seems to be the flavor of the day for those who have deemed themselves “evangelical atheists.” However, this last October another atheist author published a much anticipated book denying such a worldview. Not only did he deny such claims, but said that they are fundamentally flawed and impossible. The name of the book is Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian view of Reality is Most Certainly False, and the author is famed philosopher Thomas Nagel. Dr. Nagel is well known for his others book which have been written in the areas of epistemology and ethics. He has caught much attention for being a committed atheist, yet antagonistic to the typical party line of the “free thought” intellectuals. In many ways Mind and Cosmos is a sort of magnum opus for his career, which pieces together a lot of his thought and reflections in light of a lifetime of study. This is why this work deserves careful attention from those in Christian circles, as there is much that can be drawn from the volume as it pertains to the defense of the faith. However, there is also a need for an apologetic response to the arguments and worldview that Nagel, as an atheist, promotes in this book. But first, let’s examine the value of Mind and Cosmos for Christian apologetics.

The Positives

In this volume, Thomas Nagel’s effectively dismantles the current anti-Christian paradigm from the inside out. He does this while maintaining his admitted theophobia, while in many ways also appearing to be “fighting for the angels.” He effectively deconstructs the current paradigm pertaining to four categories; the nature of science, consciousness, cognition, and ethics/values. In arguing from the nature of science he uses an argument that has been popular for decades with Christian apologists of all stripes, yet with the academic rigor that comes with his post. Essentially, he says that the nature of the scientific enterprise and scientific knowledge presumes upon certain characteristics of the universe and how it relates to the human mind. In the beginning of the book he clearly states his goal to propose a system “that makes mind central, rather than a side effect of physical law.” In making these arguments he is not just talking about individual human minds, but the concept of “mind” overall. He argues for such a metaphysic out of the very nature of human knowledge.

“In the meantime, we go on using perception and reason to construct scientific theories of the natural world even though we do not have a convincing external account of why those faculties exist that is consistent with our confidence in their reliability-neither a naturalistic account nor a Cartesian theistic one. The existence of conscious minds and their access to the evidence, truths of ethics and mathematics are among the data that a theory of the world and our place in it has yet to explain. They are clearly part of what is the case, just as much as the data about the physical world provided by perception and the conclusions of scientific reasoning about what would best explain those data. We cannot just assume that the latter category of thought has priority over the others, so that what it cannot explain is not real.” In other words, Nagel is arguing that the existence of science itself, and transcendental absolutes, is an empirical fact that needs to be explained to justify our endeavors. Naturalists cannot just shrug their shoulders and say “that’s just the way it is.” A project, such as science, requires a foundation. Nagel repeatedly reinforces throughout his books the idea that such cognitive dissonance amongst naturalists is not acceptable. Science needs an epistemological foundation in order to function and progress. The Christian worldview provided one such worldview centuries ago, but having been rejected by “the academy,” Nagel points out that the emperor no longer has any clothes. However, as we shall see, Nagel concurs with the Christ rejecting epistemology of the academy, and merely suggests another secular alternative. But Nagel points out further, that if naturalism cannot account for scientific knowledge, or provide it an epistemological foundation, neither can it do so with consciousness itself.

Consciousness

Nagel begins chapter three by immediately “pushing the antithesis” on naturalism’s relationship to human consciousness. He declares, “Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources of physical science.” In this chapter Nagel contributes what is most likely fresh material for many Christians who would reflect on these issues. In it Nagel deals with the identity theory of human consciousness. The identity theory is the preferred option of those who hold to a naturalistic worldview. The content of the theory can be found in its name; human consciousness is identical with various brains states. In other words, consciousness is an accident of brain chemistry, much in the same way that it just so happens to be that smoke rises up from fire. However, in all their attempts to make ‘A=B,’ as it pertains to consciousness and brain states, materialists have missed the glaringly obvious fact that by their nature they are two separate entities. Nagel says, “Materialists had to explain how “pain” and “brain state” can refer to the same thing even though their meaning is not the same, and to explain this without appealing to anything nonphysical in accounting for the reference of “pain.” He illustrates that in other realms of science, for example, it is valid to indentify H20 with Water. All that water is, is H20, whether water is present or experienced. But when we are talking about consciousness and experience itself, and trying to equivocate them with a physical description, we run into issues. “Experience of taste seems to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state-something produced rather than constituted by the brain state.” He goes through several mind experiments and analogies to demonstrate that mental states are indeed a non sequitur to brain states, and that current theories do not constitute a proper explanation. One example he brings to the table is the analogy of a calculator. In trying to understand a calculator, it does not follow that the calculator displays the numbers 8 when 3+5 are entered, as an explanation. There is certainly correlation but not necessarily explanation. Without the further fact that the calculator was designed to embody an arithmetic algorithm and to display its results in Arabic numerals, the physical explanation alone would leave the arithmetical result completely mysterious. It would give the cause of the figure that appeared on the screen, but would not explain the number as such. In other words, because certain brains states are associated with certain experiences, in no way “explains” those conscious experiences in their essence. Furthermore, no evolutionary theory adequately tells us what consciousness is, or why such a phenomenon would pop up in the long battle for survival of the species. So the scientific enterprise, and consciousness itself are an enigma, or an anomaly to current theories, and they cannot simply be brushed aside. Nagel provides much more juicy material in this chapter, which I can only recommend that you read yourself, in order to benefit from it. In the next chapter Nagel aims even higher, and sets his sights on the act of cognition itself.

Cognition

This chapter of Mind and Cosmos reflects most strongly the fact that Nagel has interacted with Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga. His basic argument is that natural selection does not select for “truth.” In other words, there is no reason why the mechanism of “survival of the fittest” would produce creatures that could accurately ascend beyond the realm of mere appearances to “true beliefs” about reality. He write, “The natural internal stance of human life assumes that there is a real world, that many questions, both factual and practical, have correct answers, and that there are norms of thought which, if we follow them, will tend to lead us toward the correct answers to those questions.” Some may argue that it is necessary for advanced life to ascend to such a level of intelligence, since they operate in the real world and must contend with it. However, for mere survival, Nagel points out that it would only be necessary for creatures to perceive true appearances of reality. For survival, it would not be necessary to transcend to the level of true beliefs, universals, or “pictures” of reality. Even assuming that such is the case presupposes, in the first place, the real existence of certain transcendental absolutes which are above the particulars of the material universe. Furthermore, evolutionary theorists themselves are the subjects of such theorizing and presuppose that the picture of reality they have in their own minds is valid. “Therefore any evolutionary account of the place of reason presupposes reason’s validity and cannot confirm it without circularity.” This is the same argument that Plantinga has made against evolutionary naturalism, yet with the clarity and elegance that characterizes Nagel as an academic philosopher.

Eventually the attempt to understand oneself in evolutionary, naturalistic terms must bottom out in something that is grasped as valid in itself-something without which the evolutionary understanding would not be possible. Thought moves us beyond appearance to something that we cannot regard merely as biologically based disposition, whose reliability we can determine on other grounds. It is not enough to be able to think that if there are logical truths, natural selection might very well have given me the capacity to recognize them. That cannot be my ground for trusting my reason, because even that thought implicitly relies on reason in a prior way. Amen. Nagel concludes that cognition requires teleology for valid existence in creation. However he argues for teleology grounded in a Hegelian concept of mind slowly coming to self-awareness, rather than in the Triune God of Scripture.

Morality/Virtue

This is probably the area of Nagel’s book which is the weakest, as far as his own arguments go, as well as providing value for Christians in “pushing the antithesis” on naturalism. What is most striking about this chapter is that the whole concept of revelation is not only dismissed by Nagel, but completely ignored. Many non-Christian thinkers are completely ignorant of biblical revelation as a source of epistemology and metaphysics, and understandably so. Yet virtually all of them will recognize the religious case for “revealed” morality. However Nagel apparently ignores it all together. In considering the options, Nagel restricts himself to only subjectivism and realism in evaluating the origin of values and virtue. Subjectivism explains the truth or falsity of our value judgments in light of our own inner moral sense, whereas realism seeks to ground those judgments in our real circumstances. Nagel seems to affirm the value of both in a way, which is natural given his metaphysic of mind slowly become conscious of itself through the subjective experience of individual consciousnesses in concrete history. He argues that virtue/value comes from the “cosmic predisposition to the formation of life” and consciousness. In making his arguments he presupposes a humanist pleasure/pain value system as self-evident and the final court of appeals in terms of virtue. He writes:

[Y]et we can be motivated by the recognition that pain is bad, and that there is reason to do what will prevent it, whether for ourselves or for others. Such considerations can get us to resist the immediate, built-in motivation of present pleasure or pain, giving it only its objective value.

In making these arguments he does not provide a convincing foundation for his version of virtue to rest upon. How can he demonstrate that the human mind is not just projecting its own experience of pleasure and pain as a transcendental absolute onto the universe, claiming that it is binding upon sentient creatures? He offers no such demonstration, but merely draws out the implications of what he already assumes to be morality. Obviously, the Christian concept of morality is much more lofty and profound than the dichotomy of pleasure and pain as experienced by the creatures (although not mutually exclusive to it). Christianity affirms subjectivism and realism as they are subset’s of God’s revealed will. The moral law is written within, and the course of nature generally blesses the adherence to it. However, Nagel does argue that the mere concept of virtue contradicts a naturalistic account of reality. He argues, “we should think of ourselves as calling on a capacity of judgment that allows us to transcend the imperatives of biology.” In other words, the existence of virtue is a problem for naturalists, as Christian apologists have been arguing for decades.

Before we move on to “push the antithesis” on Nagel’s own system, and examine some of the negatives of his book, there is one more positive thing to say about his work. Even though he accepts a fundamental form of evolution, Dr. Nagel does creationists a service by legitimizing the Intelligent Design enterprise. He writes:

[e]ven though writers like Michael Behe and Stephen Meyer are motivated at least in part by their religious beliefs, the empirical arguments they offer against the likelihood that the origin of life and its evolutionary history can be fully explained by physics and chemistry are of great interest in themselves.

He says further, “[t]hey do not deserve the scorn with which they are commonly met. It is manifestly unfair.”

We should be grateful that Dr. Nagel exhibits such intellectual honesty and academic courage, given his position. Despite that, there are multiple problems with this book, both from a general worldview assessment, as well as from a specifically Christian assessment of what he is promoting in this book.

The Negatives

While Nagel’s criticism of naturalism is strong and valid, the positive worldview statements he makes are often vague, confusing, and self-contradictory. Just as he “pushes the antithesis” on naturalism, exposing her nakedness as a philosophy, the same needs to be done with his atheistical monism. Nagel begins his discussion on the nature of science by denying that the human mind can comprehend the total picture of reality in any form. Christians can certainly amen this assertion, and much of what Nagel says fits in with what theologians refer to as the archetypal/ectypal distinction in human knowledge. Yet after placing a limitation on human knowledge and saying that naturalism can in no way accurately picture reality, he states that in finding the limits of science it “may eventually lead to the discovery of new forms of scientific understanding.” Lacking an understanding of the Archetypal knowledge of God mediated to us through the ectypes of revelation, Nagel collapses back onto the same man-centered epistemology, or scientism, he criticizes, yet in a different form. It is here that he first admits he is a philosophical monist. This put him in a dichotomy where he confidently that the elegance of monism is to be preferred over the dualism of theism, and yet he admits that apart from such an aesthetic preference, knowledge may very well be fragmentary. He says “perhaps, in the worst case, there is no comprehensive natural order in which everything hangs together-only disconnected forms of understanding.” So he states that monism is to be preferred because of its unifying nature, but then he goes on to say that such a standard of unity may in fact not square with reality. But there is a problem in that if knowledge is fragmentary, we could never come to the “unified” understanding that it was so in the first place. Nagel is clearly lost here, which is not surprising, given he is grounding knowledge in human rationality, rather than in divine rationality. Like Van Til observed about unbelieving thought, he lacks a foundation for certainty; therefore, his system is caught up between the opposite poles of absolute rationalism and absolute irrationalism. His desire for a unified mind behind everything is clearly a Christian motivation, which could find rest in the doctrine of divine simplicity, yet being an unbeliever he has no basis to assert that unity of thought reflects ontology, or is to be preferred. Nagel’s straw-manning of the Christian option, and preference for monism is problematic in several other areas as well.

First of all, Nagel spends a lot of time attacking materialism and naturalism, which are the very bedrock of evolutionary theory. He even admits that the research of ID theorists is compelling and deserves to be heard. But then he moves on to embrace a Hegelian form of evolution; but upon what basis? If evolution is problematic from a metaphysical, epistemological, and empirical standpoint (as he argues), then isn’t it time to start over? It becomes clear when going through Mind and Cosmos that Nagel has chosen autonomous human reason before even the mere possibility of a transcendent God and His verbal revelation. In light of his sober criticisms of naturalism he is only left with monism and a form of self-creation or emanation. Nagel does not create much of a positive case for these views; he merely chooses it as the only alternative between naturalism and his straw-manned version of Christian theism or “dualism.” Nagel paints a picture of the Christian view, as one in which the natural world exists autonomously and which God periodically enters into, in order to “tinker” with it. According to him, this undermines the coherence of nature and invokes complicated, unnecessary entities. However, in doing this, and in arguing for simplicity while using Occam’s razor, he is borrowing concepts that are implications of the doctrine of Divine simplicity. James Dolezal wonderfully defends this doctrine, in another excellent recent publication, God Without Parts. He defines it as, “[t]he doctrine of divine simplicity teaches that (1) God is identical with his existence and his essence and (2) that each of his attributes is ontologically identical with his existence and with every other one of his attributes.” The doctrine of Divine simplicity gives us the same elegance, or unity, while maintaining the doctrine of creation and intelligent design, yet avoiding the logical contradictions inherent in monism. Of course the most blaring contradiction in his system, as in Hegelianism in general, is the concept of self-creation or unfolding. When Nagel argues for teleology without mind, he is demanding a purpose that precedes mind. The purpose or “track” that the universal mind follows in its unfolding, must precede it, as the instances of history are what this mind experiences as if becomes increasingly self-aware through each particular. Such a mind is only aware of each stage of development as it happens, therefore it cannot precede and plan the events of history. How then can there be teleology? The universal mind that Nagel proposes suffers the same problem he illuminates for individual minds in history; how does such a mind rise beyond appearances to achieve “self-awareness” pertaining to some entity out there called “universal reason.” Wouldn’t such “reason” be yet another object that needs explanation, and through which the universal mind is explained and understood? Now we are stuck with a potential infinite regress and his argument that monism is more “simple” falls apart. It is merely a surface level mirage. Furthermore, monism hardly solves the problem of the one and many, as it merely brushes aside the reality of particulars. Even if a monist desires to argue that the particulars are merely illusory, they still have the fundamental problem that when speaking of particulars, they are still referring to a definite “thing.” This, and many other issues, renders monism as incoherent. But the Christian doctrine of a transcendent God who is simple, identical with His attributes and will, and whose will is eternal and comprehensive, solves these issues. However, Nagel has already set aside this concept of theism as being a “limiting concept” (an idea he gets from Kant, not the catholic faith) and dualistic, according to his Deistic straw-man of it. He writes, “So long as the divine mind just has to be accepted as a stopping point in the pursuit of understanding, it leaves the process (of science) incomplete, just as the purely descriptive materialist account does.” However at the end of his book he admits, “It is perfectly possible that the truth is beyond our reach, in virtue of our intrinsic cognitive limitations, and not merely beyond our grasp in humanity’s present stage of intellectual development.” Again the Archtypal/Ectypal and the Creator/creature distinctions in ontology would help him here if he would submit his mind to Revelation. But Nagel has revealed he is interested in no such thing. In the book Nagel makes the admission that contrary to his colleague, Alvin Plantinga, he has no “sensus divinitatus”. However, it is not simply that Nagel lacks a sense organ, it is that he is actively suppressing the truth. Romans 1 tells us:

The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of people, who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be known about God is plain to the, because God has made it plain to them.

Nagel has said before a more honest admission “It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.” This is why he can actively expose the weakness of other non-believing worldview, all while ignoring the same issues in his own worldview; he is suppressing the truth in unrighteousness. This is also why he must straw-man the Christian worldview. Yet he also borrows concepts from the Christian worldview, and from God’s active revelation to him (reason, logic, virtue, realism), all while denying their source. He even borrows content from special revelation, as mediated to him by his colleague Alvin Plantinga. Unfortunately, Plantinga has not helped in this matter as he does not own up to the source of his worldview, but follows many other Christian apologists before him who claim they are merely making “rational” arguments. In claiming that the clarity which God’s spoken word brings is merely common to all men, they give unbelievers a warrant to lift such arguments out of their Christian context and claim that they are purely secular observations. Presuppositional apologetics is much clearer and draws the line sharper in the antithesis, than Plantinga’s supposed “reformed” apologetics. Cornelius Van Til stated concerning unbelieving thought:

In the non-Christian outlook, the space-time universe exists and is intelligible apart from God; whatever happens is random, and facts are not preinterpreted, related, or controlled by a personal mind. Value stem from man himself or are somehow inherent in nature. The individual’s own mind thus provides the connections between himself, objects, events, or other minds-as well as contributing the (purely formal) principles or law by which he thinks and evaluates and by which he orders and interprets his experience.

Van Til’s statement here seems almost prophetic of Nagel’s position. However, Van Til didn’t have a crystal ball, he just understood how the unregenerate mind works. Herman Bavinck also has some rich observations about the nature of monism and pantheism:

Kleutgen, accordingly, is right on target when he writes: "The difference between pantheism’s speculations and that of the theist… is this: whereas the former starting with assumptions-as obscure as they are unprovable-about the divine being, ends in open contradictions; the latter, proceeding from a sure knowledge of finite things, gains even-higher kinds of insights, until it encounters the Incomprehensible, not losing its grip on the fact that the One whom it recognizes as the eternal and immutable Author of all things is far above our thought processes in his essence and works."

I’m sure if both Van Til and Bavinck were alive today, they would make almost the exact same statements in response to Nagel’s book of monism as well.

Conclusion

In the end, while this book is helpful, and in many ways will provide inroads for criticism of naturalism into the academy, it also presents us with nothing new. Unbelieving thought has been developing for quite some time in the West, and many of those who have rejected the faith have also rejected naturalism. All one needs to do is look at the popularity of eastern mysticism, and the monism behind it, as well as the new age movement to see that such is the case. In the end of his book, Dr. Nagel says that the answers may come from somewhere much more radical, or a version of his philosophy that is taken further, and I wonder if such occult options could end up being the more radical versions of Nagel’s philosophy for those who follow him. If Nagel and his followers bring us to an age beyond naturalism that will mean that the Christian church will have to be ready for some changes. Many of the epistemological arguments and transcendental arguments that reformed apologists use against naturalism will also be used by other unbelieving counterparts. This will mean that a lot of the worldview “defeaters” that reformed apologists use today will have to be modified and replaced in order to disarm the credibility of idealistic monism. We could find such potential in using the same presuppositional method against monism, but by reinvestigating the rich ontology which the Christian worldview provides. Doctrines like divine simplicity and the Creator/creature distinction will have to be rethought in light of popular monism, and formulated in a similar “street” level as the “transcendental argument” was in approaching naturalism. Furthermore, the doctrine of the Trinity and the personal-relational nature of reality will also have to be reasserted and put on the offensive against the dehumanizing impersonalism inherent in monism. In the end though, we can be thankful for Nagel’s book, and as the popular unbelieving worldview potentially shifts, we must be encouraged to persevere in our mission to defend and “push-back” against claims “and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God.”

Dr. Richard Pratt on the Claim that the Bible Contradicts Itself

1) "The unbeliever has not examined the Bible and other resource materials enough to know that he has not simply misunderstood a passage which he thinks is contradictory. It is often the case that non-Christians call passages contradictory when just a little reflection shows them to be quite harmonious.

2) The unbeliever cannot examine the Bible and other resource materials enough to know that he has exhausted all the possible explanations of his so-called contradiction.

3) Until he can say with absolute certainty that there are contradictions in the Bible he cannot reject biblical authority on this basis." (Richard Pratt, Every Thought Captive, pg. 113

The thing I like about this response is that it is simple, honest, and addresses the skeptic right where he is at. Rather than allowing them to dictate terms out of their relative ignorance, points 1 & 2 demonstrate that according to their own standard of knowledge, they are overreaching. And indeed, some of the "Bible contradictions" I have been confronted with before, betray that very ignorance.

On Rocks and Omnipotence

A popular retort frequently given to the Christian worldview is the question, "can God create a rock so big that even He couldn't lift it?" When I first heard this sound bite, to be perfectly honest, I pretty much scratched my head and couldn't quite get what the point was. Most people have heard this objection before, whether they be Christian or not. It has actually become a popular response to the transcendental argument for God's existence, which I've personally observed, or observed others using in debate. When skeptics are pressed with the fact that only God gives the necessary preconditions for the laws of logic, they quickly run to the "rock dilemma" in order to supposedly demonstrate that God Himself is unintelligible and self-contradictory. It goes something like this:

Question: Can God create a rock so big, that even he cannot lift it?

Premise: If God is omnipotent, that means he can do anything.

Answer 1) God can't create a rock that is so big that He can't lift it.

Implication 1a) Then God can't "do" everything.

Answer 2) God can create a rock so big that He can't lift it.

Implication 2a) Then He's not omnipotent

Conclusion: God's omnipotence is self-contradictory, thus making God's existence impossible. Therefore, God does not exist.

Initially this might sound impressive, but it is actually a house of cards. Let's set aside the Clark/Van Til controversy, on whether or not God is bound by the laws of logic, as that discussion isn't even necessary here. Supposedly, the unbeliever here has found incoherence in the attributes of God, namely, in the very definition of "omnipotence." However, what has happened here is that they have simply stacked the deck by redefining omnipotence in their premise. If you look back at the premise, omnipotence is being vaguely defined as the belief that "God can do anything." However, is that really what the definition of omnipotence is?

The answer is no. Omni, literally means "all" or "universal," whereas potent means "power," "influence," or "effect." Remember in science class when we learned about "potential energy?" Similar concept. So omnipotence literally means that God has all, or unlimited power, or force. So by definition, if God is omnipotent, than no object could ever be beyond His power. This is logically consistent, and perfectly understandable. However, by redefining "omnipotence" as the ability to "do anything," and not as referring specifically to force/power, the unbeliever gives himself wiggle room for a bait-and-switch. What do I mean? Well lets look back at the question, with a clearer definition of omnipotence.

Premise: If God has unlimited power, then nothing he creates can be beyond his power.

Answer: God could never create a rock beyond his power.

Conclusion: Uhm, what's the point again?

See, the skeptic is trying to claim that God's omnipotence leads to a contradiction. But all they have done is a bait-and-switch by including a contradiction in the demands of omnipotence, and then they cover it up with a pliable definition ("he can do anything"). In other words, they are demanding that God show he has unlimited power, by having limited power (being able to to create a rock so big, etc...). This makes no sense, and is definitely not a standard set by the divine attribute of omnipotence. So instead of setting forth the incoherent premise "if God has unlimited power, he must have limited power," they instead frame it as "if God has unlimited power, he must be able to do anything." That latter phrase, "he must be able to do anything," is left undefined and can pertain to all sorts of things beyond power/potency. In this case, it's a cover for them demanding He be able do something which contradicts the very concept of having unlimited power! It makes no sense. God's attributes do not lead to contradictions, but to clarity. The unbeliever includes a hidden contradiction in their premise, in order to make the conclusions appear contradictory.

If unbelievers really want to be wowed by what God is able to do, they should examine the two natures of Christ. That doctrine certainly transcends our created understanding of logic without contradicting it. We would expect that if the eternal, transcendent God of Scripture has condescended to man, he would introduce concepts that would stretch our finite apprehensions. The doctrine of the incarnation does just that. The second person of the Trinity took a human nature onto his divine nature, and united the two, "inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved," as the Chalcedonian Creed tells us. Find the largest rock that man is able to lift, and Jesus in His human nature could go no further. In fact, not only was Jesus limited in His human nature, but He Himself was also crushed by a much heavier weight. The weight of God's wrath. And He did it to redeem cosmic rebels, who make up silly syllogisms in order to escape their responsibility and guilt.

"Yet it pleased the LORD to bruise him; he has put him to grief: when you shall make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his offspring, he shall prolong his days, and the will of the LORD shall prosper in his hand." (Is 53:10)

A Problem for Atheists and Agnostics

Greg Bahnsen, in discussions of epistemology, would often refer to his well-known "apple sorting machine" analogy. The analogy was between epistemology (how we know what we know) and the construction of a hypothetical machine designed to sort apples. It is very common to hear people claim that they do not have beliefs, or a worldview, but simply use method 'x' to sort out the facts and then come to conclusions. In Bahnsen's analogy, people's "neutral" epistemological methods would be compared to the apple sorting machine. Bahnsen would point out that in order to construct an apple sorting machine, one would first have to know something of what a good and bad apple consisted of, and then they would have to know how to tell them apart. Then the apple sorting machine could be designed. In the same way, in order for anyone to know true facts from false facts, they first have to know some general truths about what constitutes truth and a true fact. One would also need to know how to discern true facts from false facts. Then an epistemological methodology can be constructed to sort them. We have to know something general about what we know, before we can know how we know. We need an ontology (understanding of existence) before we can have an epistemology (an understanding of how/what particulars we can know about existence). The point being, that when people say they just use method "x" to know truth, they are not being honest. A worldview, which was ascertained by some means other than method "x," had to be in place first. This is an insightful analogy and it has many implications for discussions in apologetics. When it comes to method "x" as being the scientific method, Christians have been quick to point out that biblical presuppositions provide the worldview through which science is justified and the universe rendered intelligible. However I think this illustrates a much broader point, namely a problem that atheists and agnostics have in even speaking to the realm of theology. What do I mean?

Well, it isn't uncommon to hear self-identified atheists and agnostics make broad statements about the whole field of theology such as:

"If there was a God he would be *blank* and therefore we couldn't even know for certain"

or,

"If God existed the world would be like *this*, and it isn't, therefore there is no God."

But given their worldview, how can they know this? These are not naturalistic arguments, coming from a naturalistic worldview, they are actually theological arguments (and poor ones at that!). The problem here for the atheist/agnostic is one of epistemology. When they argue against theological knowledge, or the existence of God, they themselves are using theological arguments, or claiming to know about something they say is an impossibility. In other words, keeping in mind that ontology (knowledge of existence) precedes epistemology (how/what we can know); how can atheists/agnostics make knowledge claims, like those given above, about something that doesn't exist? They must either concede that they do have some knowledge of God, or the things of God, or they must admit that they simply can't say anything meaningful about a subject that "doesn't exist."

Some atheists are consistent here and will not make these kind of arguments. They will simply stick to their naturalistic presuppositions and try to argue that there is "no evidence" for a supernatural realm. However, it is not uncommon to hear atheists or agnostics go on the offensive by attacking the character of God, or by using the kind of sound bites listed above. If that is the case, the above criticism is valid.

I think therefore, I think?

In several discussions I've had with atheists, when the issue of epistemology comes up (I try to start with that subject), I have often heard them respond by parroting Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am). Supposedly Descartes' formula gives them a basis for knowledge apart from God or divine revelation. When pressed to give an account of what they know, or how they know, the answer is often, "well, I think therefore, I am, that's where I begin." This is convenient for the atheist, and for all unregenerate men, because it supposedly give sufficiency to the autonomous human intellect. Indeed, many have even argued that with Descartes' famous formula, the modern world, or at least modern thought, began. But is it really sufficient, and does it really provide the unbeliever with a basis for knowledge claims?

Well, actually. No.

I used to get stumped by this one, and would try to go the route that "I think therefore I am" is not sufficient to give us a basis for knowledge of the outside world, or the assumption that our cognitive abilities reflect or "image" the world around us accurately. Only the assumption of the image of God could get us there. That is still a valid argument, and useful in certain contexts, but it gives the unbeliever too much. What do I mean? Well, "I think therefore I am" is simply a deductive argument with the assumption that "I" exists, hidden in its premise. Christian philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard, and atheist philosophers like Bertrand Russel, pointed this out long ago. When Descartes said "I think," he already assumed 1) that he exists and 2) that he was the one doing the thinking. So to say "I think, therefore, I am" is similar to saying "all bachelors are unmarried." It tells us nothing new, and it certainly doesn't establish any basis for knowledge or knowledge of what exists through autonomous human reason. It merely assumes "I exist" and then smuggles that assumption into the premise and then the conclusion. If Descartes truly doubted everything he thought he knew in his meditations, he would have ended up simply with, "thoughts are occurring." That gets us nowhere, and it certainly establishes nothing about ontology (existence) or epistemology (knowledge). The title of this post is "I think therefore, I think?," but in reality it is more like, "there are thoughts, and so... yea?" Autonomous human reason fails here.

However, unbelievers know that they exist, they know that the world around them exists, and they know that their cognitive abilities can image the world around them, because ultimately they know God exists. But they know this in spite of their philosophy. In fact, their unbelief and commitment to independence from God distorts their thinking. This is why all lines of pagan thought and culture end in radical skepticism. That is why it is the Christian apologist's job to "push the antithesis," or to demonstrate that based upon their own premises, unbelievers can't know anything and they certainly cannot account for human experience. And actually, the more consistent unbelieving thought becomes, the easier it is to demonstrate the absurdity of it. Radical Skepticism's claims that "we can't know anything" is a direct violation of the law of non-contradiction. Do they know that they can't know anything?

Man was not created to reason autonomously, but analogically. We were created to "think God's thoughts after him." The quest for intellectual autonomy began not with Descartes but with the Serpent when he invited Eve to reason autonomously apart from God and His revelation. As I mentioned above, unbelievers know that God exists because He is actively revealing Himself to them, both in the depths of their own consciousness, as well as in the world around them. Paul says in Romans 1:18-20, "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, because what may be known of God is manifestin them, for God has shown it to them. For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse." As Paul says, their problem is not intellectual but moral. They are suppressing the truth in unrighteousness. And when he says suppress, he means suppress. They are not willing to admit to themselves or to others that they know God, because they are committed to independence from Him and do not want to face up to their cosmic treason. Yet their thinking about the world will continue to exhibit features that demonstrate they know God's existence. You can only hold a beach ball under water for so long. With Descartes it was the sense of "I" or personal existence, that he smuggled in. With the atheists it is often their strong sense of morality or "logic" which contradicts, and certainly doesn't flow from, their self-identified worldview.

Apologetics is done effectively then, when we demonstrate the insufficiency and impossibility of autonomous human thinking, while also pointing out the evidences in the unbeliever's own experience that demonstrates that they know God exists. Furthermore, and most importantly, they have no certainty, which undermines all of their knowledge claims. Only God's spoken Word and Spirit provides certainty about God, the world, and human experience as well as a context through which they are to be understood. We begin with the self-contained Trinity's spoken Word, not man's word spoken to himself, which gets him nowhere.

So the best way to begin with a transcendental argument from epistemology, is to simply ask an unbeliever if they could be wrong about everything they claim to know. If they are honest they will answer yes. If that is true they have no certainty, and thus no knowledge, according to their worldview. Contrast that with the Christian worldview, which says there are certain things that we cannot be wrong about, because God has revealed them, such that we can be certain. To see a practical example of this check out this.